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E C O N O M I C  C R I S I S  A N D  L O C A L G O V E R N M E N T S  




The system of local governments financing, which is used in Estonia is based on personal income tax and supports paid by the state. 
A system of that kind creates enormous inequality between the local governments. The continuing decrease of income taxes and 
the increase of tax-free minimum arises the role of state supports. Central government reduced essentially the part of income taxes 
assigned for local governments and supports in 2007–2010. That’s why the municipalities met a difficult economic situation. The 
greatest costs for municipalities is education. Government has taken a course to abolishing rural schools. As the analyses demons-
trate the schools are enormous source of incomes for municipalities. Therefore the abolishment of schools would made the financial 
situation of municipalities worse even more. A special method wasn’t created for the analysis. The classical economic means – tables, 
indexes and marginal analyses were used.
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Introduct ion
The aim of this paper isn’t the analyses of the essence of local governments, their additional functions or 
the division of their functions between state government and local governments. The essence of the local go-
vernment and its functions in a concrete state are determined by the constitution of a state. In this field diffe-
rent states have got different practices. There is a different amount of local government’s level in Europe: 
one (in Finland), two (Sweden, denmark) and even three (Italy). We originate from the present situation of 
Estonia. There are 226 local governments in Estonia with its 1.3 million people. It’s obvious that there isn’t 
any reason for a two-level (or moreover, three-level) local government system in small Estonia. The question 
lies, how the functions are divided between the central power and the local governments and how these small 
local governments can mange with their tasks. That’s why the additional functions of local municipalities 
have got an essentially smaller amount than in most EU member states. For example, the ratio of employees 
between the central level, regional level and local level is 23.9:11.9:56.7, respectively in denmark and the 
ratio of state and local governments are 22:78 in Finland. So, the structure of central government is almost 
the same in two-level and three-level local government systems – 23.9 and 22, respectively. Since also the 
GdP per person in Estonia is 2–3 times lower (according to the method used to calculate) then in most of 
these countries, it is clear that the local governments play a slightly smaller role in Estonia. In Estonia the 
local governments are not responsible for health care, employment, law enforcement and rescue services. 
Regardless to the fact that the proportion of the local government’s function has slightly increased in the last 
few years, their role in education and social care is limited.
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If we observe the financing of local governments, then we originate from the division of functions betwe-
en the central government and local governments de facto and from the situation, wherein the local govern-
ments can solve their problems. The problem is especially actual in connection with the economic crisis of 
2007–2010 and its influence on the financing of local governments. 
With an end-to-end budget the local governments are looking for a way to cut expenses. In almost all of 
the local government the biggest expense is education: schools, pre-school facilities and also extra-curricular 
facilities such as sport schools, Bobby clubs etc. It has initiated an understanding that school is a significant 
financial burden to the local government’s budget. Let us set a hypothesis – school brings into the local go-
vernment’s budget at least as much as it takes. Regarding pre-school facilities the picture isn’t as clear – these 
do not exist in all of the local governments (especially in the smaller ones) and the level of expenses varies 
significantly. Also, since the statistics for pre-school facilities is incomplete, despite the relatively large ana-
logy of the situation we will not examine them.
In scientific literature (but also in media etc) this issue has not been studied according to our data. A spe-
cial methodics wasn’t created for the analysis. The classical economic means – tables, indexes and marginal 
analyses – were used. The analysis is based on data from years 2004–2010 as the information from 2011, 
time as the paper was written, was published only partially.
In the interest of the clarity of the analysis the first step is to observe the financing system for local go-
vernments of Estonia. The proportion of individual income tax and equalisation fun (those financial channels 
that depend on school) in the local governments total income will be shown in it. We will observe the local 
government expenses to schools to prove the hypothesis. Sums added to the local governments budgets due 
to the existence of schools will be analysed more closely. In the last case it is also important to find ways to 
evaluate indirect, mediated gains.
1 .  The f inancing local  governments  in  Estonia  and Europe 
There are 226 local governments in Estonia with its 1.3 million people. The number of the citizens is 
between 92 in Ruhnu parish (it was just 68 persons a few years ago) up to almost 400.000 in Tallinn. It’s 
obvious that there isn’t any reason for a two-level local government system in Estonia. The question lies, 
how the functions are divided between the central power and the local governments and how these small 
local governments can mange with their tasks. The concentration of the power into Tallinn (together with 
the problems of the financing of the local governments) is the reason why the role of the local governments 
is considerably moderate than it’s used to in Europe. The economical importance of the local governments 
is relatively moderate in Estonia, it forms about 8–9 % of the GdP (Ulst, 2002: 465) and 6 % for some of 
them (Riigieelarve, 2004: 23–49). The same index was 23 % in Finland, 25 % in Sweden and even 33% in 
denmark in 1995 (Raju, 2010: 348). As GdP per person in Estonia is 2–3 times lower (it depends on the 
method of the estimation) than in these states, so it’s obvious that the role of the local governments in Estonia 
is much more moderate. The local governments of Estonia don’t vouch for health, employment, security, and 
lifesaving service. despite of some improvement of their role in recent years their role is limited in education 
and social welfare services. But there’s a lack of financial aids even for such a limited amount of functions; 
the system of their financing is unsatisfactory. different systems of financing of local governments are used 
in Europe. Conditionally, these systems could be divided into two groups. According to the first system the 
local government gets its revenues from the entrepreneurship of the region. The plus of the system is the 
interest it makes to the development of the entrepreneurship – the more developed the entrepreneurship is, 
the bigger are the revenues of the local government.
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Table 1. The structure of the incomes of the local budgets in Estonia









Incomes 1288 100 1454 100 1292 100 1270 100
Taxes  676 52,5 794 54,6 692 53,6 650 51,2
Personal income tax inside it 630 48,9 734 50,5 634 49,1 585 46,1
Land tax 35 2,7 48 3,3 48 3,7 51 4,0
other taxes 11 0,9 12 0,8 10 0,8 14 1,1
Equalization fond 92 7,1 92 6,3 70 5,4 70 5,5
Block grant from state budget 208 16,1 240 16,5 221 17,1 230 18,1
Other state grants 94 7,3 100 6,9 45 3,5 52 4.1
Transfer from foundations 24 1,9 26 1,8 69 5,3 69 5.4
Economic activity 151 11,7 153 10,5 151 11,7 153 12.0
Others 43 3,4 49 3,3 44 3,4 46 3,6
Source: The author’s calculations based on the Ministry of finance homepage. http://www.fin.ee/  
According to the second system the local governments get the main part of their incomes from the taxes 
based on properties (tax for a real estate, tax for a car, tax for a bicycle, tax for the land, and tax for the heri-
tage) and from several compensations for the use of the natural resources (as the payment for the usage for 
fishing, water, local building materials etc), it makes no difference whether they are called taxes, fees or so-
mehow else. In Estonia the proportion of these taxes and payments is currently 3.5 % from the total revenue 
of the local governments (Table 1 and 2). 
In Estonia the sources for local governments’ incomes according to the Local Government Financial 
Management Act are: 1) tax revenues; 2) revenues from sale of goods and services; 3) received support; 
4) others. This group forms the main income source for local governments and it includes personal income 
tax, land tax and the fee for using natural resources. The distribution has changed repeatedly since these taxes 
were set. Local taxes were set by the local governments in accordance to the law. In this case the inspector of 
taxes is the local government, but with a contract the duties can be transferred to the revenue office’s county 
division. The local governments have been allowed to set taxes since 1996. The sources of income for Esto-
nia’s local governments are versatile and there about 100 units of income source positions can be found in 
reports. Generally the local governments’ incomes are divided as shown in table 1. As it is visible, the main 
source of income is personal income tax, which is a divided tax. That means that the sums go partly to the sta-
te and partly to the local governments according to the persons registered place of residence. From the 2007 
by the system of financing of local governments of Estonia first of all the local governments get a part of the 
income tax from the persons of their territory, which is equal to 11.9 % of the gross income. Unfortunately it 
was repeatedly cut during the economic crisis: in 2009 it was 11.3 %, in 2010 11.39 %, in 2011 11 % and in 
2012 11.4 %. This cutting of the rate of allocations enhanced the sums going to the local governments (Table 
1). The share of local taxes in local governments’ budgets is modest, advertisement tax and road and street 
closure tax are more widely used; also, parking charge is remarkable in bigger cities (Table 2).
The local governments get a significant part of their incomes from the state budget in addition to personal 
income tax. These sums are either single-purposed (table 1 block grand) or for local governments with a 
lower base of income as an equalisation fund (Table 1 equalisation fund).
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Table 2. Local taxes in Estonia 2010








Local governments using taxes 1 3 47 19 8 1
Income from local taxes 
(thousand euros)
3 5544 37 019 19 072 79 727 68
Source: Ministry of Finance. http://www.fin.ee/?id=11191
In addition to the income tax the local governments get an essential part of their revenues of the budget 
as transactions from the state budget. These sums are dedicated or support funds for the local governments 
of lower revenue basis.
2 .  Problems in  personal  income tax base f inancing   
The financing system of the local governments, which basis on the personal income tax, contains una-
voidably several dissentions in Estonian conditions. The amount of the functions of the local governments in 
Estonia is smaller than it is considered to be right in Europe; and that’s in spite of their certain extension. The 
extension of the functions of the local governments unavoidably enlarges their expenses. 
First of all, the difference between the smallest and the greatest salary is continuously growing, so the 
difference inside the income tax per person differentiates among the local government units. In 2004 the 
difference was 501 euro (the largest in Viimsi – 567euro and the smallest at Peipsiääre – 66 euro) or 8.6 
times. In 2007 it was 9.5 times or 953 euro (The biggest in Viimsi – 1064 euro per person and the smallest 
at Peipsiääre – 111 euro per person. In 1999 it was 4.3 times (by the calculations of the author according to 
the data from Estonian Towns Union). The difference would be even more if a greater part of the personal 
income would be left to the local county governments.
Another problem, which exasperates the usage of the income tax as the main source of revenue, is the 
rise of the untaxed minimum. Today the untaxed minimum is so little in Estonia that it can’t carry on its 
social functions. Also, the amount of the present untaxed minimum of Estonia isn’t in accordance even with 
the minimal conceptions, which have been developed in European Union. Therefore, Estonia will unavoi-
dably meet the enlargement of the untaxed minimum, which will decrease the main component of the local 
governments’ revenue basis – personal income tax. The first possibility to relieve the total inequality is to 
differentiate the proportion of the income tax, which will be left to the local governments (the interest rate). 
These local governments, which have got a higher average salary on their territories, get a smaller per cent 
from the personal income tax on the basis of the system and the other way round: these local governments, 
which have got a lower average salary on their territories, a bigger per cent. A system of this kind equalizes 
(in some amount) the level of the revenues of the local governments.
The differentiation of the per cent of the separation of the personal income tax in the budgets of the local 
governments makes problems first of all to these local governments, who are proceeding from one group 
to another. A situation may arise where the incoming income tax of the local governments is decreasing 
together with the rise of the salary. Therefore the delimitation of the groups makes problems. And certainly, 
10–20 greatest local governments of the biggest group (among them is Tallinn, too) are against a system of 
that kind. 
The differentiation of the part, which goes to the local governments from the income tax doesn’t solve the 
problems, which come from the rise of the untaxed minimum. (once more it has to be stressed that the rise 
of the untaxed minimum will be unavoidable in the next years.)
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3.  The cost  basis  and revenue basis  f inancing
The financing of the local governments has been tried to be approached as according to cost basis, so 
according to income basis. Both the positions have got their supporters. But we haven’t found considerable 
works of economical theory, which would analyse the problem according to Eastern European states.
The budgets of the local governments were compiled according to cost basis in Estonia until 1995 i.e. 
they were paid from the expected costs of a concrete local government. It was difficult to bring them out, so 
the estimation of the level of the costs of the next year was practically done through a principle – the level 
of the costs of the last year plus some growth percentage. If a local government succeeded in “uprising” the 
percentage of the costs in one year, then a comfortable life was ensured for many years. 
In order to liquidate a situation of that kind, which is characteristic to socialistic controlled economy and 
would stimulate economic mismanagement, it was decided to transit to the financing of the local govern-
ments according to the revenue basis i.e. it’s the variance, which was in use with some modifications until 
2003 and which critics has been given before. The system was frequently tried to be improved in 1996–2002 
(the planned own revenue per person of the last period was replaced with the real revenue, the method of 
the estimation of the real amount of population was improved etc). These improvements have led to the 
demolishment of the system according to the revenue basis. The example of the latter ones are the living al-
lowances, which are given to the local governments according to the cost basis; the money for the municipal 
schools etc. All together they can be compared with the money divided according to revenue basis (Kohalike, 
2004). So, de facto we’ve reached a situation wherein the local governments are financed as according to cost 
basis, so according to income basis.
A question, if a financing according to cost basis or according to revenue basis has been arisen in the last years. 
As it has been said, the local governments are as about the cashiers while paying living allowances etc 
as they get money from the state and pay it according to the laws. The problem of a budget – cost basis or 
revenue basis – doesn’t matter that part of the budget of the local governments – this part of revenues can 
be only according to the cost basis. The problem if according to cost basis or according to income basis has 
been actual in the estimation and the assurance of the own revenue per person; that’s been especially actual 
while finding out and dividing the amount of the equalization fund. The principle of dividing the fund was 
dominantly according to the revenue basis in 1996–2002. The less the own revenues per person of a local 
government (personal income tax, land tax, operating payment for the natural resources) were – the more 
money from the equalization fund was given. If the inland revenues arose, the sums from a concrete relief 
fund for the local government lessened at once. That decreased the motivation of the local governments to 
increase their own revenues per person. Another insufficiency of the formula used in 1996–2002 to divide 
the relief fund was its total separation from the costs. The essential level of costs per person could be and 
is different among the local governments. It depends on the aged and sexual structure, the dispersion of the 
settlements (so, the length of the communications – streets, roads, technological settings etc) and other fac-
tors. The formula of the relief fund ignored these factors. 
The division of the equalization fund is based on a new formula since 2003. It’s trying to integrate the 
cost basis (which was used before 1995) and the revenue basis (1996–2002) approaches. The support T allo-
cated from the budget equalisation fund (here in after equalisation fund) to a local government budget shall 
be calculated as follows: (Ministry of Finance http://www.fin/ee/index.prp?id)
T = (AK – AT) · k, 
Where: 
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T – size of the budget equalisation fund in the specific local government;
AK – calculated average operating expenses of the specific local government;
AT – calculated revenue of the specific local government;
k – coefficient of level of support;
Cn – the number of children (0–6 years of age), number of school-age children (7–18 years of age), 
size of the working population (19–64 years of age)and the number of elderly persons (more 
than 65 years of age) according to the data in the population register, the calculated length of 
local roads and streets (roads with solid surface by coefficient 0.26, city streets by coefficient 
0.74; roads with non-solid surface by coefficient 0.047) in kilometres according to the national 
register of roads and the weighted average number of disabled persons who are taken care of 
and to whom caregiver services are provided according to the caregiver‘s allowance report last 
three years at the specific local government;
Pn – calculated average operating expenses in euro per child, school-age child, person of working 
age, elderly person, disabled person who is taken care of and person to whom caregiver services 
are provided and per kilometre of the calculated length of local road and city street in local 
governments;
– the total amount of the number of children, school-aged children, persons of working-age, 
elderly persons, the weighted average number of disabled persons who are taken care of and 
to whom caregiver services are provided in the specific local government multiplied by the 
calculated length of local roads and city streets in kilometres adjusted by coefficients and the 
calculated average operating expenses of local governments in euro calculated per unit in 
respect of each corresponding indicator;
TM – receipt of personal income tax at the specific local government in 3 last years, respectively, 
multiplied by 11.4% and divided by the calculated income tax rate for the local government in 
force in the relevant year  
– calculated land tax in the specific local government;
RM – receipt of the extraction tax for the mining right and the fee for the special use of water in the 
specific local government in last 3 years
The formula doesn’t satisfy all the problems arising from weak revenue basis of many local governments, 
that’s in spite of its complicatedness, which also makes its usage more difficult. Its usage offers to delay the 
cardinal reforms in the creation of the local governments’ revenue basis in 3–4 years, but it doesn’t solve the 
existing problems. That’s why the new searches for financing the local governments are especially important. 
4 .  Economic cr is is  as  a  reducer  of  the budgets  of  local  governments
The economic crisis, which captured Europe in 2008–2010 and hasn’t still ended in some states, influ-
enced the economic situation of local governments, particularly their budgets. The governments of majority 
states proceeded from the necessity to support the local governments as the governing institutions, which 
are the nearest to people in a situation of that kind (EN-EERP, 2010). As Estonian state budget essentially 
decreased and the role of local governments in the total expenses of public sector decreased, so it’s obvious 
that the budgets of local governments decreased much more than the budget of central government. Also, it 
took place under the conditions wherein the role of local governments in the expenses of public sector is the 
lowest in Estonia.
The decrease of the incomes of the budgets of the local governments is especially obvious if the structure 
of the decrease of tax funds from table 1 would be observed. The individual income tax decreased the most 
in 2008–2009; it forms the biggest part of tax incomes of local governments. To top it all, the central go-
vernment decreased the part of individual income tax for the local governments from 11.93 % gross profit to 
11.4 %, it means by 4.45 %. The state saved its budget by increasing taxes (Table 4). 
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Table 3. Estonian state budget and local budgets 2007–2010

















State budget 5250 +12,1 5537 +5,4 5477 +1.1 5610 +2,4
Local budgets 1288 +8,9 1454 +11.9 1292 -11,2 1270 -1,8
Source: the author’s calculations based on the Ministry of Finance homepage. http://www.fin.ee/.
The excises and turnover tax were increased, but not the individual income tax; it means, the taxes co-
ming in the budget of central government not for the local governments, were increased. Also, the sums paid 
from the budget to support the local governments were essentially decreased by the state. The sums paid for 
local governments from the equalization fund were 92 mil euro in 2007, 92 mil euro in 2008, 70 mil euro in 
2009, 70 mil euro in 2010 and  71 mil euro in 2011 (Table 1).
Table 4. Rates of the main taxes in Estonia in 2008–2010 (per cent)
Taxes 2008 2009 2010
Social benefits tax    33    33   33
Income tax    21    21   21
VAT    18   191   20
Percentage of excise tax in retail sales   12.9   17  17.5
Unemployment insurance tax (employer)   0.30  0.881  1.25
Unemployment insurance tax (employee)   0.60  1.731   2.5
1measured average of the year’s real tax rates
Source: Homepages Ministry of Finance. http://www.fin.ee/index.php?id=233 
It’s generally considered in Europe that the economic crisis has finished in spite of still existing problems. 
The same has been repeatedly declared by Estonian government. But there aren’t any changes in planning 
incomings among state taxes in 2011. The amount of incomes in local budgets from individuals has been left 
on the level of 2009, it’s 11.4 %. The excises for tobacco products and the excise for electricity will arise 
among from the taxes but these won’t influence the budgets of local governments directly. Also, the sums co-
ming in from the equation fund won’t increase. Consequently, the level of the budgets of local governments 
will still remain lower than it was before the crisis for a long period.
As Estonian state budget was “saved” by support from EC and the rise of tax rates (Table 4), the local 
governments’ budgets continued to decrease. 
5 .  School’s  direct  impact  to  local  governments’ budget
School is a place, where the financing is not based on incomes but on costs. Schools economic expenses 
and the salaries of the teaching staff are paid from the state budget according to the amount of students. State 
budget is used to finance bigger investments as well – renovating schools or building new schools. As the 
local government here so-called the cashier the minimal possible expenses from the local governments to 
school is 0. The local governments’ have got back in the last few years 11.4 % of total income from salaries. 
Estonian local governments altogether spent 553 million euros on schools (12 million for primary schools, 
144 million for secondary schools, 386 million on high-schools and 11 million on schools for adults) in 2010, 
which was almost 30 % of the total budget of local governments (Kohalike, 2011).
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Figure 1. Local governments and central government income in Estonia 2007–2011
Source: Ministry of Finance. http://www.fin.ee  
Initially, it seems that the local government is just the cashier regarding this money – the money comes 
from state budget and goes out as well. Although the local governments do not have anything to say in spen-
ding this money there is still a direct financial interest from the local governments – the income tax paid from 
this money goes to the local governments according to the formula below. Therefore it can be said that thanks 
to the schools the local governments directly received of the salaries in those expenses multiplied by 11.4 %. 
There is no official statistics to show how much of the finances spent for schools consist of salaries (at 
least according to our data). However, it is possible to find it in few local governments based on their input 
data. The city of Tartu spent 14.1 million euros on schools, out of which 10.7 million euro or 79.7 % (authors 
calculations based on input data) on salaries in 2010. Using the same method for calculation this percentage 
in the town Viljandi was 80 % and in Ülenurme parish 80.1 %. As the deviations were very small then by the 
usage of 80 % as average and by considering the possible mistakes it is possible to say that the salaries from 
school added approximately 553 x 0,8 x 0.114 = 50.4 million euros (according to the author input data to 
the local governments’ budgets in 2010). In reality this sum is bigger; it’s based on ceteris paribus principle, 
the additional income in the form of salaries for employees of school catering, heating and other facilities 
providing service for schools. This issue will be studied more closely below.
The situation is more complicated with pre-school childcare and sport and hobby schools (extracurricular 
activities). Their funds do not come from the state budget; the finances spent on the personal income tax go 
to the budget of local government’s. on extracurricular activities in 2010 the local governments spent 49.1 
million euro and on pre-school childcare 108.6 million euro (Kohalike, 2010). The fact, which makes calcu-
lations difficult, is that accountancy for these is different from comprehensive schools; that’s why it is even 
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more complicated to bring out the expenses on salaries. In Tartu it was approximately 71–72 % in 2010; the 
accountancy did not make it possible to study this data with enough accuracy (Tartu has its own agenda done 
extra analyses which helped here in Viljandi and Ülenurme). Based on the data from Tartu it can be said that 
return income from these sums was in 2006 at least (49.1+108.6) x 0.7 x 0.114 = 12.6 million euros. Extra 
incomes from the salaries for people working for companies providing services for schools have not been 
considered here either. The extra indirect incomes from income taxes from the investment sums from the 
state budget are extremely important. However, in these local governments (especially in the smaller ones), 
wherein new schools have been built with state funds these sums have been highly significant in some years. 
It’s regardless to the fact that these smaller local governments had to use the services of builders from abroad.
There can be one conclusion. due to several reasons mentioned here in the next few years the local go-
vernments funding system, which is based not on personal income tax has to be cardinally reformed (Raju, 
2007). Therefore, the budgets of local governments need extra income sources at least to the extent of 50–60 
million euros to compensate the loss of return incomes during this reform.
However, the schools effect on the budget of local governments is only positive. Regardless to the size of 
the coefficients the formula includes an inconsistency. This inconsistency exists with the salaries of teachers 
as well. The bigger they are, the smaller is the sum from the compensation fund. Therefore, the income from 
the salaries of teachers and other staff related to schools decreases the sums coming from the compensation 
fund (AK in the formula above). At the same time it is all AT in the formula considered as the variable. This 
means that finally everything depends on the variable, which is more significant in finding Tn. The variable 
AT for the last year’s income tax is calculated with the coefficient of 0.5 (earlier coefficients were respective-
ly 0.3 and 0.2), it is clear that the level of earnings of constant rises, the difference AK–AT (which is the most 
important factor for calculating the compensation fund’s size) are due to school (salaries of people related to 
school) positive. Hence the conclusion – school brings to the local government more incomes then expenses 
from the equalization fund. It can be applied to those local governments that get extra finances from the equ-
alization. As for those local governments that do not get finances from equalization fund, every euro from 
income taxes is simply an addition to the budget. (NB! Approximately 40 % of the population in these local 
governments!) The rest have to be taken into account if the income from personal income taxes increases the 
sums from equalization fund would decrease according to the formulas coefficient k, which has so far been 
0.9. This value for the coefficient means that from every euro from income taxes the return fund’s sums will 
be decreased by 0.9 x 0.5 = 0.45 euros in he following year, the year after that by 0.3 x 0.9 = 0.27 euros and 
in the third year by 0.2 x 0.9 = 0.18 euro. So, the statement, that the local governments should not increase 
their own revenues because it automatically decreases the sums from revenue fund by 90 %, isn’t corrects.
In conclusion I would like to stress that all the calculations above have been made without considering 
indirect incomes (income tax from institutions providing services for schools) and without income tax from 
single payments from the state budget (particularly for building and renovating schools). These revenues will 
be studied below.
6.  School  as  the indirect  increasers  of  the revenues of  local  governments
Most of the people related to schools get their salary from the state and a smaller proportion from the 
budgets of local governments. Teachers and headmasters get their salary from the state; the rest of the school 
staff – economic staff (cleaners, workmen, heaters etc), extracurricular activities guidance, speech therapist, 
psychologist etc. get their salary from the local government. Schools pay for contract work (mostly repai-
ring works in the summer period in addition to those mentioned above). The school functions as a mediator 
for trading (this is where most of the money is spent) and for catering staff the school is being heated and 
supplied with water; also, school uses transport (mostly buses), school is a considerable mediator that offers 
work for the bank etc. From all these and other not mentioned payments the personal income tax goes again 
to the budget of local government’s.
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The amount of the income tax from these indirect payments that support the budget of local government 
is difficult to calculate. However, let us try to bring out this sum at least approximately.
It is useful to divide these payments into two factors in order to find the growth of local governments 
budgets based on these indirect incomes. one can be named second level complementary incomes. This 
includes the income tax from services provided directly for schools, such as payments for bus companies 
for using the bus for a field trip. others are extremely indirect incomes such as income taxes from a cashier 
who was paid in relation to the fact that a teacher paid for merchandise to the cashier with their salary. It is 
possible to find the first one with somewhat specific results and the second one probably not.
As pointed out previously the local governments spent on education in 2010 was 553 million euros. 
Approximately 80 % of it went to salaries. The schools paid 19 million euros for several services. In addition 
the local governments paid 5 million euros for several assistance services, 7 million euros for students’ buses 
and 10 million euros for other expenses (not the schools staff). So, the local governments paid 41 million 
euros for these services (author calculations, Rahandusministeeriumi, 2010). To add 17 million euros from 
pre-school education and 8 million euros for sports and hobby schools we can see that the local governments 
paid 63 million euros related to education. Based on how much the salaries form GdP, which was 47.7 % 
in 2010 the payments as salaries from the sum were 30 million euros from which the income tax to the local 
governments (11.4 %) was 7.9 million euros. Certainly, this calculation is approximate but considering that 
the bills the schools pay divide among different fields – transport, heating, school supplies, catering etc. – it 
is possible to assume that the average proportion of salaries is not very different from Estonian average.
It is much more difficult to bring out how much the sales increased for banks, retail trade etc. in relation 
to the schools. In any case the personal income tax to the local governments could not have been smaller then 
from direct bills. Therefore, it can be said that the actual return income to the budgets of local governments 
due to schools is at least 60 million euros bigger. New funding system means must be found to compensate 
that amount as well during the transition to.
Schools earn some money themselves. Incomes from educational institutions’ economic activities were 
44 million euros in 2010 (Kohalike, 2010). It increased local government’s incomes, too (minus the expenses 
made to earn it).
7 .  The inf luence of  chi ldren on the coeff ic ients  of  equal izat ion fund
As stated above, those local governments, whose income is below 90 % of the average of state, average 
income gets extra payments from the equalization fund. The amount of school age children is included to the 
formula above to calculate equalization fund. So, the number of children effect the size of equalization fund, 
is included. Certainly, the formula doesn’t state whether these children really attend school in the territory 
where they are registered or if they attend a school at all; but simplifying, as we did above, we can consider 
them as schoolchildren with only a minor mistake in the calculations (at least calculating the average because 
if they do not attend a school in their home parish with a few small exceptions on the territory of another 
local government).
There is a multiplication Cn · Pn, where Cn is the amount of people in the age group on the territory of 
local government (in our calculations schoolchildren are of age 7–18) and Pn is calculated by the average 
operating expenses in euros per child, school-age child, person of working age, elderly person, disabled 
person who are taken care of and persons to whom caregiver services are provided per kilometre of the cal-
culated length of local road and city street in local governments, in the formula. Local government’s income 
is subtracted from the sum of all the age groups’ multiplications. The difference is the base for finding the 
equalization fund’s sum for the local government.
Since a large amount of the sum of child related expenses comes from the state budget, there is a double 
effect here. The sum includes almost 100 % school related expenses – the other expenses, such as playgrounds 
etc, play a marginal role in the budgets of local governments. The coefficient Pn in the age group 0–6 is 
13.133, in 7–8 it is 10.443, in the age group 19–64 it is 4.325 and in 65+ it is 6.285. It means that every child 
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gives twice the money the adult does. The specific sum depends on the difference between expenses and in-
comes in the local government’s budget. Considering the differences in the coefficients in 0–6, 7–18, 19–64 
and 65+ age groups it becomes clear that due to the children almost 40% of the compensation fund is divided 
(don’t forget that part of these funds are divided by the road network on the local government’s territory.
8.  School’s  incomes are  bigger  than costs
Let us try to compare the sums going to the budgets of local government’s budgets (and coming from 
them) that are related to schools. We will exclude the finances, wherein local governments are merely the 
cashier such as teacher salaries, which come directly from the state budget and for which the local govern-
ments can’t chip in. 
As mentioned above, the expenses of local governments for schools that were not covered from the state 
budget in 2010 were 373 million euros. The existence of schools directly increased the budget of local go-
vernments from extra income taxes by 313 million euros. At least 640 million euros of income tax is added 
to this from salaries of several service providers. The local governments are on the positive side with this 
calculation alone as about managing schools. This means that expenses made to schools are smaller then the 
(extra) income received due to schools.
The sums that the local governments receive regarding single significant payments from the state budget 
to build and renovate schools are not considered here (the income tax from the salaries of the builders goes 
to the budget of local governments). Also, the money schools receive for several services is actually an extra 
income for the local governments (in 2010 44 million euros) (Rahandusministeerium...). With this sum the 
expenses made to provide the services would certainly have to be deducted, but the current system for repor-
ting can not differentiate it.
Those local governments that do not get payments from compensation fund 1 can’t longer be analysed. 
However, for those, which get payments from compensation fund 1, the extra incomes from the fund are 
linked to the income tax from the salaries paid through schools, and the amount of school-aged children. The 
income tax decreases payments from the fund 0.5 k in the first year, 0.3 k in the second and 0.2 k in the third 
where k is a coefficient of 0.9. Therefore it is less than the common opinion of 90 %.
conclusions 
1. The possibilities of the local government’s financing system of Estonia, which is based on personal 
income taxes, are running down. Unavoidably accompanying great differences in the levels of in-
come tax and consequently the local government’s revenues and the unavoidable rise of the untaxed 
minimum demand a cardinal and rapid reform of the present system.
2. Leaving a bigger part from the income tax to local governments can’t solve the problem of the 
weakness of their revenue basis and groundlessly great difference. Even if the part will be risen up 
to 100 %, the weakness of most local governments’ revenue basis would not be solved. At the same 
time the difference between the local government revenue levels rises essentially (that will intensify 
even more together with the essential rise of the untaxed minimum).
3. The congruence of the cost basis and the revenue basis of the financing of local governments has 
been arisen in the last years. There aren’t any considerable works of economic theory, which would 
analyse the problem according to the situation of Eastern European states.
4. The economic crisis of 2008–2010 was directly expressed in the financial situation of local govern-
ments. Majority of European states considered it necessary to support financially the local governments 
as the governing institutions, which are the closest ones to people. The relative importance of local gov-
ernments in total expenditures of public sector increased as a result of it in many states in these years. 
5. The income ta, which is got from the wages paid by school, is a source of move funds from the state 
budget to the local governments’ budgets due to it. The extra sum of money from income taxes thanks 
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to the payments made in all children’s institutions in 2010 was even with incomplete calculations 
more than 650 million euros.
6. The amount of money to the local governments thanks to the exsistence of schools in 2010 was at 
least 40 million euros. In addition to the abovementioned facts all the local municipalities, which 
doesn’t get any compensation from compensatory fund, get additional profit due to schools. The ad-
ditional income forms a remarkable percentage of the decrease of compensatory fund’s 1 sums for 
the local municipalities getting profit from compensatory fund. School has got a dual influence on 
the sums of compensatory fund 1. As the formula of the sums of compensatory fund income has co-
efficients, which put the incoming sums into dependence from the age division of the population, so 
the local municipalities, who’ll have more children, get more assignments due to greater coefficient 
in age group 0–6 years. The wages paid in schools and pre-schools increase the profit.      
7. In addition local governments receive extra revenues thanks to schools otherwise they receive com-
pensation from the equalisation fund. In those local governments which receive payments from the 
equalisation fund this extra revenue from income taxes decreases the amount from the equalisation 
fund. The school has two effects on the payments from the equalisation fund. There are coefficients 
in the formula for calculating the equalisation fund that link the sums with age groups, then thanks 
to the coefficients in age groups (0–6 13,133; 7–18 10,44; 19–64 4,33; 65+ 6,28) those local govern-
ments with more children receive more revenue. That’s way the salaries in schools and children’s 
institutions increases their own incomes. From the equalisation fund (in 2010 90 million euros) those 
local governments get more revenue if their own income per person is smaller. But the revenue for lo-
cal governments didn’t decrease with the coefficient 0.9 as it is widely thought but significantly less. 
8. Incomes from educational institutions provided services added 45 million euro to the local govern-
ment’s budgets. With the current accounting system it is not possible to bring out which part belongs 
to school and which from the educational institutions.
9. Costs of pre-school institutions are dominantly covered from local governments’ budgets (they are 
not compensated directly from the state budget). That’s why the costs of pre-school children’s insti-
tutions are bigger to the local governments then the revenue regardless to parents’ participation. The 
current accounting system is practically impossible for bringing out those costs.
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Estijoje taikoma savivaldybių finansavimo sistema paremta pajamų mokesčiu ir centrinės valdžios tei-
kiama parama. Tai lemia didelę nelygybę tarp savivaldybių. Besitęsiantis pajamų mokesčio mažėjimas ir 
neapmokestinamo minimumo kilimas didina centrinės valdžios paramos įtaką. Centrinė valdžia 2007–2010 
metais gerokai sumažino tiek pajamų mokesčio dalį, skirtą savivaldybėms, tiek tiesioginę paramą. dėl to 
savivaldybės pateko į sunkią ekonominę situaciją. didžiausios išmokos savivaldybėms skiriamos švieti-
mui, vyriausybė ėmėsi mažinti mokyklų skaičių kaimo vietovėse. Analizė parodė, kad mokyklos yra didelis 
savivaldybių pajamų šaltinis, todėl tolesnis jų skaičiaus mažinimas tik dar labiau pablogintų savivaldybių 
finansinę padėtį.
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